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Since 1991 Australian telecommunications has undergone substan-
tial reform. To a large extent, the economic correctness of pro-
competitive policy depends on the non-existence of natural monopoly
technology. This paper provides estimates of the Australian tele-
communications system cost structure, and tests for subadditivity
from 1943 to 1991. Additivity of the cost function after 1945 rejects
the natural monopoly hypothesis and supports recent government
policy. Diminished natural monopoly characteristics suggest that co-
ordination between ¢rms through networking can achieve similar
economies as internal co-ordination within a monopoly. This ¢nding
is important, given the trend towards network unbundling, and service
provision through interconnection.
I Introduction
Since 1991, the Australian telecommunica-
tions system has undergone substantial reform.
The former publicly owned monopoly Telstra,
established through the 1990 merger of Telecom
and OTC, has been corporatized and partly
privatized.1 Competition in long-distance, inter-
national and mobile markets was fostered
through the introduction of a private competitor
Optus in 1991, with unrestricted market entry
allowed after 1997. Administrative safeguards
concerning network access and interconnection
for new entrants were intended to reduce the
risk of anti-competitive behaviour by the ver-
tically integrated incumbent. To a large extent,
the economic correctness of the above policy
choices critically depends on whether Australian
telecommunications exhibited natural monopoly
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characteristics.2 Quiggin (1998, 1999) suggests
that recent Australian telecommunications policy
fails to adequately account for natural monopoly.
He argues that alternative institutional structures,
designed to exploit economies of scale and scope,
may have provided lower industry costs. In
particular, he calls for the restoration of full
government ownership of Telstra, which would
act as a common carrier system for cable TV and
local telephony.3 This would allow consumer
access to all content providers regardless of the
carrier supplying their access to the cable
network.
Several potential sources of natural monopoly
are possible in local telecommunications markets.
Traditionally, returns to scale in local services
arise from economies in the physical provision of
basic services and in managerial economics of
size, such as network planning, co-ordination
and management.4 Economies of scale can also
arise as local networks are characterized by large
network and call externalities that lead to a larger
increase in tra¤c volume than in the number of
subscribers (Sung and Gort 1997). Further, there
are economies of sole provision due to cost
savings accruing to integrated planning of net-
work growth and switching capacity (Heenan
1989).5 However, what is a natural monopoly is
likely to change with technology and shifts in
demand. For instance, while technology change
may allow competition in previously monopolistic
industries, it may also generate new sources of
natural monopoly (Maddock 1999). Toward this
end, it is unclear whether local telephone services
currently involve a natural monopoly technology.
As noted by King (1997), the existence of
a natural monopoly technology in Australian
telecommunications is ultimately an empirical
question. The cost structure of the telecommun-
ications system can be estimated to infer the
natural monopoly status of the industry. Un-
fortunately, the received econometric evidence of
the presence of natural monopoly in telecom-
munications is largely unhelpful (Table 1). For
instance, Evans and Heckman (1984, 1986) reject
the hypothesis that the United States (US) Bell
system was a natural monopoly during the pre-
divestiture period, while RÎller (1990a, 1990b),
Diewert and Wales (1991a, 1991b), Pulley and
Braunstein (1992) and Braunstein and Pulley
(1998) ¢nd the system a natural monopoly.
Braunstein and Pulley conclude that ¢ndings
concerning the natural monopoly hypothesis for
the Bell System are `fragile'. In particular, they
suggest that careful attention be given to the
functional form of the cost function, and the
properness of the estimated cost surface in both
the estimating and forecast output regions.6
Further, all of the above studies are based on the
Christensen et al. (1983) data set that contains
31 annual time-series observations for the Bell
system. Evans and Heckman (1988) conclude that
¢nding better data, and not alternative estimation
metrics, would be a more fruitful line of inquiry.
The need to analyse Australian telecommunica-
tions systems cost data is even more necessary
given the distinctly di¡erent institutional arrange-
ments that has governed Australian and US
industry evolution.
This paper provides the ¢rst publicly available
estimates of the Australian telecommunications
system cost structure. Estimation is on a unique
data set constructed from Australia Post,
Postmaster-General's (PMG) Department and
Telecom Australia annual reports from 1926 to
1991. Tests of the system's cost structure for the
presence of natural monopoly characteristics are
2 The Hilmer committee recognized that when a ¢nal
good or service is most e¤ciently produced by a natural
monopoly technology then their competitive supply is
socially wasteful (King 1997). An industry is a natural
monopoly when its cost function Cqi is subadditive.
That is, CSiqi  SiCqi for all output vectors qi
(Baumol 1977; Baumol and Braunstein 1977).
3 Common carriers o¡er telecommunications services
to the public at large. Traditionally, common carriers
have accepted universal service obligations for a high
level of regulation that prevents them from facing open
competition.
4 Returns to scale in switching and transmission of
signals enables service to be best provided within a local
area through one or more switches, giving rise to a
minimum e¤cient network size. The primary asset in a
local network is the number of access lines, which are
supported by switches and employees. A larger network
may be able to handle randomly varying demand more
e¤ciently by reallocations of capacity among switching
and transmission equipment (Greenwald and Sharkey
1989).
5 Potential economies of scope can arise from service
to multiple local markets, joint provision of local and
long-distance services, and joint provision of telephone,
data and pay-TV services (Quiggin 1998).
6 A proper cost function is non-negative and linear
homogeneous, concave in input prices, and has positive
marginal cost schedules.
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also undertaken. A test for natural monopoly for
Australian telecommunications may seem un-
necessary at this point, with the sector open to
competition. Nevertheless, the presence of eco-
nomies of scope may prove important for issues
facing an emerging information economy. For
instance, whether the recent spate of mergers to
form global communications companies, and so
allow the delivery of service bundles, is in the
Australian public interest. Evidence presented
here might provide some indication as to the
extent of cost e¤ciencies achieved from
convergence of broadcasting and telecommun-
ications operators. The presence of natural
monopoly characteristics also presupposes that
market co-ordination between separate ¢rms
(by networking or interconnection) is less able
to achieve the same economies as internal co-
Table "
Received Economic Evidence
Study Firm Period Function Outputs Properness
checked
Subadditivity
Bernstein (1988) Bell
Canada
1954^1978 Generalized
Translog
Local, Toll Not
Reported
Not Reported
Bernstein (1989) Bell
Canada
1954^1978 Dynamic
Translog
Local, Toll Not
Reported
Not Reported
Braunstein and Pulley
(1998)
Bell
system
1947^1977 Composite Local, Toll Yes Global: Yes
Charnes et al. (1988) Bell
system
1947^1977 Translog Local, Toll Not
Applicable
Local: Yes
Diewert and Wales
(1991a)
Bell
system
1947^1977 Normalized
Translog
Local, Toll Yes Local: Yes
Evans and Heckman
(1983, 1984, 1986,
1988)
Bell
system
1947^1977 Translog Local, Toll No Local: No
Foreman and Beauvais
(1999)
101 GTE
Cellular
Market
Areas
1996^1998 Translog Cellular Not
Reported
Not Applicable
Guldmann (1990) Forty-
Four US
LECs
1980 Translog Local, Toll No Not Applicable
Lopez (1997) Telefonica
(Spain)
1974^1994 Generalized
Translog
Local, Toll Yes Not Applicable
McKenzie and Small
(1997)
Five
Cellular
Firms
1993^1995 Composite Cellular Yes Not Reported
Pulley and Braunstein
(1992)
Bell
system
1947^1977 Composite Local, Toll Yes Expanded
local: Yes
RÎller (1990a) Bell
system
1947^1979 CES-Quadratic Local, Toll Yes Global: Yes
Seri¢ca (1998) PLDT
(Philippine
Telecom)
1951^1993 Translog Local, Toll No Local: Yes
Shin and Ying (1992) Fifty-Eight
US LECs
1976^1983 Translog Local, Toll Yes Global: No
Sung and Gort (1997) Eight US
LECs
1951^1991 Translog Local, Toll Yes Local: Yes
Note: LECs are local exchange carriers.
340 ECONOMIC RECORD DECEMBER
ordination within a ¢rm. With increasing
unbundling and interconnection of telecommun-
ications services, it is not clear that this pre-
sumption holds (Albon et al. 1997).
The paper is organized as follows. A selective
history of the Australian telecommunications
system is given in section II, and telecommun-
ications performance from 1950 to 1991 is de-
scribed in section III. Section IV discusses the
merits and appropriateness of applying the
translog cost function, and describes the data
used for estimation. The introduction of a
quadratic spline function to model technological
change is described in section V and its
integration into the cost function in section VI.
An empirically tractable test for local subadditiv-
ity is described and implemented in section VII.
Concluding remarks and policy implications are
provided in section VIII.
II The Australian Telecommunications System
The Constitution Act 1900 authorized the
Commonwealth government to take over and
administer the postal and telegraph departments
of each State of the newly formed Common-
wealth. On 1 March 1901, the separate Colonial
departments were amalgamated into the PMG
Department of the Commonwealth. The PMG
was solely responsible for telecommunications
service provision and regulation until the Over-
seas Telecommunications Act 1946 established
OTC to provide international facilities and
services. The Telecommunications Act 1975
separated post and telecommunications service
provision, and established Telecom as the pro-
vider of local and long-distance telephone
services. In 1981, AUSSAT was created to de-
velop a national satellite system, while AUSTEL
was established as the independent regulator in
1989. The Telecommunications Act 1991 intro-
duced competition into the market place. Telecom
and OTC merged into a single general carrier,
Telstra, while Optus Communications purchased
AUSSAT to create a second general carrier. The
Commonwealth government assured Optus that
no new general carrier licences would be granted
prior to July 1997. The Optus licence required
the company to supply long-distance and inter-
national services to the entire Australian popu-
lation by December 1997 (Bureau of Transport
and Communications Economics 1995). Post-
1997 arrangements require that general carriers
interconnect any other carrier or service provider
on request, so long as su¤cient capacity is
available and the speci¢ed interconnection is
technically feasible. On 1 July 1997, regulatory
responsibility was passed from AUSTEL to the
Australian Competition and Consumer Com-
mission.
III Telecommunications Performance
Australian telecommunications performance is
described by various productivity, cost and out-
put measures. 7 Partial productivity measures are
presented in Figures 1^3. The ratio of telephone
mainlines to full-time employees (MPE) provides
an indication of labour productivity relating to
the construction, maintenance and operation of
the network. The rapid increase in MPE, 4.6 per
7 Revenue and costs are de£ated by the CPI
(1990 100).
Figure "
Mainlines per Employee 1950^91
Source. Communication Economics and Electronic
Markets Research Centre (CEEM; 2001).
Figure á
Revenue per Employee 1950^91
Source. CEEM 2001.
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cent per annum (p.a.) from 1950 to 1991, largely
re£ects capital for labour substitution. Labour's
share of telecommunications total costs declined
from 78 per cent in 1950 to 34 per cent in 1991.
Another indicator of labour productivity is the
ratio of telecommunications service revenue to
full-time employees (RPE). RPE has also ex-
perienced substantial growth during the post-war
period (5.1 per cent p.a.) and re£ects, in part,
labour-shedding e¡ects. The ratio of telecom-
munications service revenue to mainlines (RPL)
measures capital productivity. RPL provides a
guide to the intensity of network usage and is im-
portant to investment planners as it provides an
indication of the required payback period. RPL
declined from 1950 to 1959, and then experienced
steady growth until the mid-1970s. A substantial
fall in RPE in the mid-1970s coincides with the
break up of the PMG into Australia Post and
Telecom.
Figures 4 and 5 show total cost per mainline
and exchange (o¤ces with one or more
subscriber lines connected), respectively. Total
cost per mainline is stable during the post-war
period which suggests costs have grown com-
mensurately with mainlines. Cost per exchange
increased 6.2 per cent p.a. from $110,471 in
1950 to $1,305,573 in 1991. This re£ects a
reduction in exchanges as new technology has
allowed the geographical coverage of local
service areas to be extended. For instance, the
proportion of telephone lines connected to
automatic exchanges increased from about 61
per cent in 1950 to approximately 99 per cent
in 1980. Finally, data on telecommunications
outputs are presented in Figure 6. Local calls
increased 6 per cent p.a. from 1950 to 1991.
Facilities for subscriber dialled trunk calls were
introduced in the mid-1960s. Between 1970 and
1991, toll (long-distance) calls grew at a rate of
11.2 per cent p.a., compared to 6.2 per cent p.a.
for local calls.
Figure â
Revenue per Mainline 1950^91
Source. CEEM 2001.
Figure ã
Total Cost per Mainline 1950^91
Source. CEEM 2001.
Figure ä
Total Cost per Telephone Exchange 1950^87
Source. CEEM 2001.
Figure å
Number of Telephone Calls 1950^91
Source. CEEM 2001.
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IV Cost Function Estimation
Telecommunications technology can be studied
empirically using a variety of methods such as
cost, distance, labour-requirements, production,
pro¢t or transformation function approaches.
The cost function approach de¢nes the ¢rm's
minimum cost of providing a set of telecommun-
ications services, conditional on given purchase
prices of the factors of production and on a
particular state of technology. Cost function
speci¢cation implies the output level is exo-
genous. Australian telecommunications services
were provided by a public monopoly until 1991.
The monopoly was not allowed to choose its own
production level to maximize pro¢ts, but required
to supply all services demanded at regulated
prices, subject to meeting universal service obliga-
tions. Since decisions were made with regard
to the determination of the optimal levels of
inputs, the speci¢cation that input levels are
endogenous and output is exogenous is a reason-
able assumption.
Australian telecommunications can be de-
scribed by the multi-product translog cost
function. The key advantage of the translog is
that it avoids imposing a priori restrictions on
substitution elasticities. Further £exibility is in-
corporated into the cost model by adding a spline
function that allows for non-constant exogenous
technical change.8
V Quadratic Spline Function
Quadratic spline functions provide an e¤cient
method of allowing model parameters to vary
across sub-samples of the data while maintaining
continuity at the joins. Radical changes in tech-
nology over the sample period require a function
capable of permitting the e¡ects of technology to
change from one era to another. Speci¢cation of a
£exible technological progress function is pro-
vided by
Tech  a0  b0tÿ t0  c0tÿ t02  d0
 a1  b1tÿ t1  c1tÿ t12  d1

Xn
i2
ai  bitÿ ti  citÿ ti2  di 1
where t is a time trend, ti are speci¢c ¢xed
periods (or knots), the dummy variable d0  1
when t0 < t  t1 and zero otherwise, d1  1 when
t1 < t  t2 and zero otherwise, d2  1 when
t2 < t  t3 and zero otherwise, and the ai, bi and
ci are parameters to be estimated.
To ensure the technology function meets at the
knots and is continuous to at least the ¢rst
derivative, it is necessary to constrain (1).
Following Suits et al. (1978), the Tech function is
speci¢ed as
Tech  a0  b0tÿ t0  c0tÿ t02  c1 ÿ c0
 tÿ t12D1  c2 ÿ c1tÿ t22D2

Xn
i3
ci ÿ ciÿ1tÿ ti2Di 2
where the Di are de¢ned as: D1  1, if t1 < t and
zero otherwise, and D2  1, if t2 < t and zero
otherwise.
Setting t0  0, (2) becomes
Tech  a0  b0t c0t2  c1 ÿ c0
 tÿ t12  D1  c2 ÿ c1tÿ t22  D2

Xn
i3
ci ÿ ciÿ1tÿ ti2  Di 3
VI Cost Function Restrictions
To ensure a proper cost function is estimated,
symmetry and homogeneity restrictions are im-
posed. Symmetry restrictions imply that gLT  gTL
and dLK  dKL. Homogeneity restrictions imply
that bL  bK  1, dLL  dLK  0, dKL  dKK  0,
rLL  rLK  0, rTL  rTK  0, fwL1  fwK1  0,
fwL2  fwK2  0 and lL  lK  0. Imposing these
restrictions on the translog cost function with
quadratic spline arguments allowing for four
intervals results in the estimating equation:
ln
C
wK
 
 a0  aL ln qL  aT ln qT
 bL ln
wL
wK
 
 mt gLT ln qL ln qT
 rLL ln qL ln
wL
wK
 
 rTL ln qT ln
wL
wK
 
8 The translog is often criticized for not being robust
at close to zero output levels. RÎller (1990b) uses a
generalized CES-quadratic cost function that can model
cost behaviour in the range of zero outputs. Pulley and
Braunstein (1992) propose the composite cost function,
which combines the log-quadratic input price structure
of the translog with a quadratic structure for multiple
outputs. The composite cost function improves on the
CES-quadratic form by not imposing separability.
Here, the translog is used with greater attention paid to
the properness of the estimated cost surface.
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 lL ln qL  t fL0 ln qL  t2  fL1 ln qL
 tÿ t12  D1  fL2 ln qLtÿ t22  D2
 fL3 ln qLtÿ t32  D3  lT ln qT  t
 fT0 ln qT  t2  fT1 ln qTtÿ t12  D1
 fT2 ln qTtÿ t22  D2
 fT3 ln qTtÿ t32  D3  lwL ln
wL
wK
 
 t
 fwL0 ln
wL
wK
 
 t2  fwL1 ln
wL
wK
 
 tÿ t12  D1  fwL2 ln
wL
wK
 
 tÿ t22  D2  fwL3 ln
wL
wK
 
 tÿ t32  D3  gLL 12 ln qL2
 gTT 12 ln qT2  dLK 12 ln
wL
wK
  2
 gtt 12 t2  ft1 12 tÿ t12  D1
 ft2 12 tÿ t22D2  ft3 12 tÿ t32D3 4
where ln is the natural logarithm operator, C is
the total cost of producing telephone services, qL
is the number of local calls, qT is the number of
toll calls, wL (labour price) is total salary expense
divided by the number of employees, wK (capital
price) is calculated from residual expenses (total
cost less labour expenses), divided by mainlines.
All data are obtained from CEEM (2001).
By Shephard's Lemma xi  @c=@wi, where xi is
the quantity demanded for the ith factor. The
corresponding cost share equation for labour is
SL 
@ ln C
@ ln wL
 bL  dLK ln
wL
wK
 
 rLL ln qL  rTL ln qT  lwLt fwL0t2
 fwL1tÿ t12  D1  fwL2tÿ t22  D2
 fwL3tÿ t32  D3 5
Summary statistics for all variables are provided
in Table 2.
The translog cost function (4) and labour share
equation (5) are estimated by Zellner's (1962)
seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE)
technique using annual data from 1926 to 1991.
Model estimation allows for ¢rst-order auto-
correlation in each equation. Restricted SURE
results for (1) are presented in Table 3.
Twelve of the 18 estimated coe¤cients are
signi¢cant at the 10% level. All ¢rst-order terms,
except for toll output, are signi¢cant while the
second-order output coe¤cients are of plausible
magnitudes. These latter estimates contrast with
those of Evans and Heckman (1984), Bloch et
al. (1998), Charnes et al. (1988) and Sera¢ca
(1998) which have absolute values in the range
of four to ten. Large second-order output
elasticities imply that a per cent increase in
output causes an implausibly large change in
the output cost elasticity, and suggests inferences
regarding economies of scale and scope must be
fragile (Braunstein and Pulley 1998). For labour
input price, the cost elasticity or factor share co-
e¤cient (Labour) is positive and has plausible
magnitude.
Table á
Summary Statistics
Mean Std dev. Max Min
Cost ($m) C 1100 2017 7906 13
Local calls (m) qL 2448 2437 9446 300
Toll calls (m) qT 311 462 1832 23
Labour price ($) wL 5991 8737 32163 384
Capital price ($) wK 105 169 647 6.60
Capital share SK 0.34 0.13 0.66 0.16
Labour share SL 0.66 0.13 0.84 0.34
Table â
Restricted Sure Estimation Results For 4
Variable Parameter t-ratio
Constant ÿ2.009 ÿ0.518
Local 0.994 2.144
Toll ÿ1.625 ÿ0.661
LocalLocal ÿ0.009 ÿ0.178
TollToll 1.258 1.391
LocalToll ÿ0.319 ÿ2.108
TechnologyLocal 0.010 1.503
TechnologyToll ÿ0.092 ÿ1.750
Technology 0.490 3.147
TechnologyTechnology ÿ0.019 ÿ1.471
LocalLabour price ÿ0.031 ÿ4.068
TollLabour price ÿ0.037 ÿ2.204
Labour price 0.436 4.235
Labour priceLabour price 0.086 2.589
TechnologyLabour price 0.004 3.321
Spline 1 (1928) 0.013 2.128
Spline 2 (1968) 0.008 1.202
Spline 3 (1978) ÿ1.537 ÿ1.726
Cost function Labour share
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.43
Autocorrelation ÿ0.01 ÿ0.01
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The time placement of knots is a priori di¤cult
as the impact of technical progress on costs is not
directly observable. Following Diewert and Wales
(1992), a grid search determines the location of
the three knots (Spline 1, Spline 2 and Spline 3)
of the quadratic spline according to the maximum
of the likelihood function. To derive estimates
consistent with theory, all spline interaction
parameters are set to zero. The splines allow for
shifts in technology by modifying the time trend.
As indicated in Table 3, Spline 1 corresponds to
1928, Spline 2 to 1968 and Spline 3 to 1978.
Spline 1 is located very close to the beginning of
the sample data and, by its location, suggests a
substantial change in technology between the
1926^28 period relative to the 1928^68 interval.
Moreover, Spline 1 and Spline 2 are located close
to data points corresponding to shifts in toll
output in periods 1931 and 1960. The former
point coincides with the Great Depression while
the latter accords with the introduction of
extended local service areas (PMG 1960).9
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the
estimated translog cost function. Own price
elasticity estimates of demand for labour (EPL)
and capital (EPK) are inelastic for the entire
sample. TECH, the per cent change in cost due
to changing technology, is negative when
technology is cost saving. TECH is found always
positive and large in magnitude, although the es-
timates decline through time. Elasticity estimates
of cost for local (EQ1) and toll (EQ2) output are
unit elastic and inelastic, respectively.10 Returns
to scale (RS) show constant returns to scale until
the post-war period, and then trend upward, re-
vealing scale economies by the 1980s.
VII Properness and Subadditivity
When cost function estimation is undertaken
with a view to testing for natural monopoly,
global information about the cost function is
required. To overcome data limitations, Evans
and Heckman (1983, 1984) propose a local test of
natural monopoly that does not require global in-
formation on ¢rms' cost functions by restricting
the test to the admissible region. The admissible
region is the area where no ¢rm produces less of
either output than is observed in market data,
and the hypothetical ¢rms produce in the range
of ratios of outputs actually observed in these
data. This restriction avoids making inferences
outside the observed output combinations, while
the test area is restricted to the region where the
estimates are most likely to be well behaved (the
centre of the observations). Their test rejects
global subadditivity when subadditivity is re-
jected in a region, while acceptance of local
subadditivity does not imply global subadditivity.
Formally, the cost function CqL; qT, is sub-
additive at qL; qT if and only if
CqL; qT CfqL  1ÿ fqL;oqT
 1ÿ oqT  CfqL;oqT
 C1ÿ fqL; 1ÿ oqT 6
for all 0  f;o  1.
For ¢rms A and B, and outputs qL and qT, the
degree of subadditivity associated with alternative
output allocations f;o are de¢ned as
Subf;o  CT ÿ CAf;o ÿ CBf;o
CT
7
where CAf;o and CBf;o are the costs to ¢rm
A and ¢rm B of producing the output combina-
tions qLA; qTA and qLB; qTB, respectively, and
CT is the cost of single ¢rm production. The
production levels for A and B of the two goods
are determined by
qLA  fqLA ÿ 2qLM  qLM
qTA  oqTA ÿ 2qTM  qTM
8
where 0  f, o  1, and qLM and qTM are the
minimum levels of local and toll output observed
in the sample. When Subf;o > 0< 0, the
monopoly situation is less (more) e¤cient than
the two-¢rm allocation described by that f;o
combination. The value of Subf;o represents
the per cent gain or loss from two ¢rm production
versus single ¢rm production. In calculating the
Subf;o in (7), the ¢tted cost function from (4)
for each year is used. Total observed output is
divided between the hypothetical ¢rms and total
cost for each ¢rm is calculated using the estimated
cost function (4) with the theoretical outputs
rather than the observed total output.
As none of Evans and Heckman's hypothetical
output combinations satisfy the conditions of a
proper cost function, their subadditivity tests are
9 The PMG Annual Report for 1960 reported a 40
per cent diversion of tra¤c from toll to local calls
through the extension of local call areas.
10Negative EQ2 implies negative marginal costs of
toll output. This ¢nding is not unique to this study with
Diewert and Wales (1991a) reporting negative values
of @C=@q2 for 21 of their 31 observations.
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Table ã
Summary Statistics for Translog Cost Function
Years EPL EPK TECH EQ1 EQ2 RS
1926 ÿ0.0479 ÿ0.0321 0.4602 1.0722 ÿ0.0186 0.9491
1927 ÿ0.0476 ÿ0.0324 0.4586 1.0662 ÿ0.0223 0.9579
1928 ÿ0.0418 ÿ0.0382 0.4570 1.0610 ÿ0.0224 0.9628
1929 ÿ0.0408 ÿ0.0392 0.4555 1.0543 ÿ0.0242 0.9707
1930 ÿ0.0402 ÿ0.0398 0.4535 1.0517 ÿ0.0255 0.9745
1931 ÿ0.0448 ÿ0.0352 0.4543 1.0278 ÿ0.0241 0.9963
1932 ÿ0.0327 ÿ0.0473 0.4532 1.0187 ÿ0.0238 1.0051
1933 ÿ0.0329 ÿ0.0471 0.4507 1.0200 ÿ0.0245 1.0045
1934 ÿ0.0327 ÿ0.0473 0.4475 1.0259 ÿ0.0286 1.0027
1935 ÿ0.0296 ÿ0.0504 0.4441 1.0337 ÿ0.0297 0.9961
1936 ÿ0.0293 ÿ0.0507 0.4404 1.0438 ÿ0.0379 0.9942
1937 ÿ0.0285 ÿ0.0515 0.4380 1.0442 ÿ0.0412 0.9970
1938 ÿ0.0287 ÿ0.0513 0.4347 1.0516 ÿ0.0426 0.9912
1939 ÿ0.0295 ÿ0.0505 0.4321 1.0528 ÿ0.0478 0.9949
1940 ÿ0.0291 ÿ0.0509 0.4302 1.0499 ÿ0.0527 1.0028
1941 ÿ0.0291 ÿ0.0509 0.4281 1.0476 ÿ0.0551 1.0075
1942 ÿ0.0292 ÿ0.0508 0.4267 1.0404 ÿ0.0613 1.0214
1943 ÿ0.0306 ÿ0.0494 0.4249 1.0368 ÿ0.0733 1.0379
1944 ÿ0.0306 ÿ0.0494 0.4227 1.0352 ÿ0.0729 1.0392
1945 ÿ0.0314 ÿ0.0486 0.4196 1.0412 ÿ0.0705 1.0302
1946 ÿ0.0326 ÿ0.0474 0.4164 1.0472 ÿ0.0684 1.0217
1947 ÿ0.0297 ÿ0.0503 0.4134 1.0517 ÿ0.0689 1.0174
1948 ÿ0.0303 ÿ0.0497 0.4107 1.0545 ÿ0.0716 1.0174
1949 ÿ0.0314 ÿ0.0486 0.4072 1.0629 ÿ0.0743 1.0115
1950 ÿ0.0286 ÿ0.0514 0.4044 1.0665 ÿ0.0720 1.0055
1951 ÿ0.0317 ÿ0.0483 0.4017 1.0689 ÿ0.0809 1.0122
1952 ÿ0.0298 ÿ0.0502 0.3994 1.0690 ÿ0.0863 1.0177
1953 ÿ0.0296 ÿ0.0504 0.3982 1.0603 ÿ0.0819 1.0220
1954 ÿ0.0295 ÿ0.0505 0.3955 1.0625 ÿ0.0834 1.0214
1955 ÿ0.0445 ÿ0.0355 0.3933 1.0613 ÿ0.0857 1.0250
1956 ÿ0.0443 ÿ0.0357 0.3912 1.0592 ÿ0.0881 1.0297
1957 ÿ0.0437 ÿ0.0363 0.3886 1.0615 ÿ0.0921 1.0316
1958 ÿ0.0432 ÿ0.0368 0.3862 1.0613 ÿ0.0932 1.0329
1959 ÿ0.0407 ÿ0.0393 0.3839 1.0612 ÿ0.0972 1.0373
1960 ÿ0.0444 ÿ0.0356 0.3814 1.0623 ÿ0.1001 1.0393
1961 ÿ0.0457 ÿ0.0343 0.3791 1.0618 ÿ0.1015 1.0413
1962 ÿ0.0446 ÿ0.0354 0.3767 1.0625 ÿ0.1048 1.0442
1963 ÿ0.0424 ÿ0.0376 0.3743 1.0626 ÿ0.1084 1.0480
1964 ÿ0.0415 ÿ0.0385 0.3719 1.0627 ÿ0.1121 1.0520
1965 ÿ0.0402 ÿ0.0398 0.3693 1.0649 ÿ0.1100 1.0472
1966 ÿ0.0383 ÿ0.0417 0.3667 1.0664 ÿ0.1143 1.0503
1967 ÿ0.0387 ÿ0.0413 0.3642 1.0680 ÿ0.1179 1.0525
1968 ÿ0.0360 ÿ0.0440 0.3616 1.0692 ÿ0.1191 1.0525
1969 ÿ0.0584 ÿ0.0216 0.3591 1.0701 ÿ0.1209 1.0534
1970 ÿ0.0608 ÿ0.0192 0.3567 1.0711 ÿ0.1250 1.0569
1971 ÿ0.0598 ÿ0.0202 0.3546 1.0687 ÿ0.1257 1.0604
1972 ÿ0.0622 ÿ0.0178 0.3522 1.0690 ÿ0.1283 1.0630
1973 ÿ0.0637 ÿ0.0163 0.3499 1.0690 ÿ0.1327 1.0680
1974 ÿ0.0629 ÿ0.0171 0.3474 1.0697 ÿ0.1371 1.0723
1975 ÿ0.0666 ÿ0.0134 0.3452 1.0686 ÿ0.1420 1.0792
1976 ÿ0.0619 ÿ0.0181 0.3432 1.0659 ÿ0.1442 1.0849
1977 ÿ0.0575 ÿ0.0225 0.3410 1.0647 ÿ0.1458 1.0882
1978 ÿ0.0576 ÿ0.0224 0.3389 1.0632 ÿ0.1499 1.0949
1979 ÿ0.0551 ÿ0.0249 0.3371 1.0591 ÿ0.1532 1.1039
1980 ÿ0.0552 ÿ0.0248 0.3350 1.0566 ÿ0.1563 1.1107
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unlikely to be reliable (RÎller 1990a; Diewert and
Wales 1991a; Salvanes and TjÖtta 1998). To avoid
this problem, Salvanes and TjÖtta suggest testing
for subadditivity over the consistency region
where the cost function is proper.11 Prior to
conducting subadditivity tests, the regularity
conditions for a proper cost function are con-
sidered. Linear homogeneity in input prices and
symmetry are imposed a priori during estimation,
while continuity follows from the functional
form. The marginal cost with respect to outputs
are non-negative when12
@ ln C
@ ln qi
 ai  gi j ln qj  lit fi0qit2
 fi1tÿ t12  D1 
Xn
k2
fiktÿ tk2  Dk
 gii ln qi  0 9
Substitution of cost function estimates and
sample observations into (9) reveals that none of
the 66 observations have negative marginal costs
with respect to local output. The ¢nal properness
condition is that the cost function be concave
in input prices. Following Diewert and Wales
(1987), the cost function is concave in input prices
since the matrix
Gq  dLL ÿ S

L1ÿ SL
dKL  SKSL
dLK  SLSK
dKK ÿ SK1ÿ SK
 
10
is negative de¢nite (where  indicates the estim-
ated cost shares). Finally, both local and toll
service doubled by 1943, making it the ¢rst
possible year for implementation of the sub-
additivity test. Between 1943 and 1991, the ratio
of local to toll output lay between 4.88 and 21.67.
Subf;o is calculated for the combinations of
f;o corresponding to f  0; 0:1; 0:2; . . . ; 0:9; 1
and o  0; 0:1; 0:2; . . . ; 0:9; 1 for each year 1943
through 1991.13 When f is equal to zero, the ¢rm
produces only the observed minimum in local call
output. When f is equal to one, the ¢rm has 100
per cent market share of the output in excess of
twice the observed minimum local call output.
Similarly, o has the same interpretation for toll
output. Figure 7 plots the maximum Subf;o
from 1943 to 1988. An upward trend in Subf;o
from negative to positive values suggests the
evolution of cost additivity is associated with
exogenous technology change. The maximum
Subf;o is negative from 1943 to 1945. After
1945, the maximum Subf;o is positive, reject-
ing local subadditivity of the cost function. Of
particular interest is the point of entry for Optus
close to the introduction of competition. Firm A
is set as a new entrant in the long-distance market
competing with an incumbent monopolist, pro-
viding minimum local service, but capturing 50
per cent of the toll market Sub0; 0:5. This
con¢guration yields a subadditivity measure of
0.6517, showing that two ¢rms provide telecom-
Table ã (continued )
Years EPL EPK TECH EQ1 EQ2 RS
1981 ÿ0.0540 ÿ0.0260 0.3321 1.0611 ÿ0.1584 1.1078
1982 ÿ0.0538 ÿ0.0262 0.3301 1.0583 ÿ0.1620 1.1157
1983 ÿ0.0515 ÿ0.0285 0.3274 1.0611 ÿ0.1658 1.1170
1984 ÿ0.0480 ÿ0.0320 0.3258 1.0553 ÿ0.1701 1.1296
1985 ÿ0.0461 ÿ0.0339 0.3235 1.0549 ÿ0.1731 1.1341
1986 ÿ0.0429 ÿ0.0371 0.3207 1.0577 ÿ0.1751 1.1330
1987 ÿ0.0402 ÿ0.0398 0.3181 1.0597 ÿ0.1770 1.1329
1988 ÿ0.0363 ÿ0.0437 0.3165 1.0542 ÿ0.1827 1.1474
Note: TECH  @ ln C
@t
;RS 
X @ ln C
@ ln qi
 ÿ1
; i  L;T:
11When the consistency region is not empty, it is
within this region that a productivity measure such as
the degree of subadditivity makes sense. With the test
region being the consistency region or the domain of
the estimated cost function, the ¢nding of natural
monopoly locally is a necessary and su¤cient condition
for global natural monopoly.
12Note that (9) is the cost elasticity with respect to
output. However, since the elasticity is de¢ned as the
ratio of marginal to average costs, positive marginal
costs require positive elasticities.
13 Firms are prevented from producing zero outputs
where the translog cost function would not be de¢ned.
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munication services 65 per cent more e¤ciently
than the government controlled monopoly. The
hypothesis that the production of Australian local
and toll services is a natural monopoly is rejected
after 1945 since the cost of single ¢rm production
is higher than the cost of two ¢rms producing the
same level of services.
VIII Conclusions
Since 1991, the Australian telecommunications
system has been privatized and competition in-
troduced. The economic correctness of the pro-
competitive policy depends on the natural
monopoly status of Australian telecommuni-
cations at the time policy was implemented. This
paper provides the ¢rst publicly available estim-
ates of the Australian telecommunications system
cost structure. A test of the system's cost structure
for natural monopoly characteristics is under-
taken, with careful attention given to ensuring
the subadditivity test is implemented over the
proper region of the cost surface. Finally, we
follow Evans and Heckman's (1988) dictum and
¢nd data of longer span, constructed from
Australia Post, PMG and Telecom Australia
annual reports for 1926^91.
The estimated cost function is statistically well
speci¢ed, with all second-order output coe¤cients
displaying plausible magnitudes. The subaddivity
test is calculated for each year from 1943 through
1988. Additivity of the cost function after 1945
rejects the natural monopoly hypothesis and
provides quali¢ed support for recent government
policy that has progressively introduced more
competition into Australian telecommunications
markets. Diminishing natural monopoly charac-
teristics also suggests that market co-ordination
between separate ¢rms through networking is
able to achieve similar economies as internal co-
ordination with a monopoly. This ¢nding is
important given the trend towards unbundling
telecommunications network elements, and the
provision of telecommunications services through
interconnection.
Finally, RÎller (1990a, 1990b) and Pulley and
Braunstein (1992) suggest that tests for natural
monopoly are sensitive to the functional form of
the cost function. Future research will employ a
composite cost function to examine subadditivity
in Australian telephone services. The composite
cost model is useful because it also permits the
measurement of economies of scale, economies of
Figure æ
Maximum Gain Loss from Two-¢rm
Production vs. Single-¢rm Production 1943^88
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scope and subadditivity, without prejudging their
presence. Finally, as market data become avail-
able, a test for subadditivity will be implemented
for output combinations dictated by actual Optus
and Telstra market shares.
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